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Solving goals—like deciding word problems or resolv-
ing constraints—is much easier in some theory presenta-
tions than in others. What have been called “completion
processes”, in particular in the study of equational logic,
involve finding appropriate presentations of a given theory
to solve easily a given class of problems.
We provide a general proof-theoretic setting within
which completion-like processes can be modelled and stud-
ied. This framework centers around well-founded orderings
of proofs. It allows for abstract definitions and very general




It is common when defining a theory axiomatically to ask
whether the chosen axioms (like Euclid’s axiom of paral-
lels) are independent. Dependent axioms are superfluous
from the point of view of the theory (set of theorems); such
redundancies can be removed. Similarly, one speaks of in-
dependent sets of equations, or of alternative presentations
of algebras. In these cases, one is comparing sets of for-
mulæ based simply on number or total size.
One also speaks of solving equations, or, more gener-
ally, sets of constraints. In such a context, one cares about
the form of formulæ. The process of solving transforms a
defining set for the problem into formulæ in solved form;
see [11]. In Gaussian elimination, for example, one begins
with a set of linear equalities involving unknowns, and in-
fers solved forms assigning numerical values to each un-

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known, or most general relations between variables. This
corresponds to the point of view that arithmetic is a cheap
form of inference, while equation solving is relatively hard.
Thus, once one has derived a solved form, it is easy to check
whether other linear equalities follow.
In these examples, as in many others, one is given an
axiomatic presentation, and sets up a goal of deriving cer-
tain formulæ: theorems in Euclidian geometry, in one case;
solutions of equations, in the other. In both cases, some
presentations of the underlying theory are better suited for
solving the given problem that others. The goal of the work
described here is to define the “best” axiomatic presentation
to solve a given problem.
We compare presentations in terms of the quality of
proofs they allow. Our theory is, therefore, based on a con-
cept of “good” proofs. The archetypical instance of this
paradigm is finding decision procedures for the uniform
word problem in an equational theory: the best proofs are
rewrite (“valley”) proofs; the best presentation is a terminat-
ing Church-Rosser rewrite system. For more on rewriting,
see [2, 17, 36].
Good proofs
What makes for a good proof? Consider a naı̈ve example:
Suppose we have an equational theory defined by the ax-
ioms  and 	 . Then 
 and
 are two proofs of  , but, clearly, the sec-
ond is better that the first, as it is shorter. More generally, in
proof theory, one assigns ordinals to proofs and shows that
under certain circumstances there exists a formula in a proof
that can be replaced in a way that reduces the ordinal of the
proof. These proof-theoretical concepts can be extended to
dynamically changing proof systems (see [16]).
In this paper, proof quality is measured via a well-
founded proof ordering on the set of proofs: the smaller
in the ordering the better. In this way, we generalize the
1
proof-ordering method used in term-rewriting for establish-
ing properties of rewrite-system completion procedures [5]
to the abstract setting of arbitrary proof systems, supplied
with an ordering of proofs.
The best presentation
Completion processes have been devised in various dif-
ferent contexts, but in a rather similar fashion. These
include: standard Knuth-Bendix completion [26], equa-
tional completion [30], completion in specific algebras (like
order-sorted ones [19]), inductionless induction (initiated
by Musser; see [25]), ordered completion [7, 20, 27], com-
pletion for semantic unification [13, 18], to mention a few.
The formalization of the completion mechanism, as well as
its correctness and completeness, has been intensively stud-
ied, beginning with the seminal work of Gérard Huet [21]
and especially since the introduction of proof orderings in
[6]. The universality of “completion” in automated deduc-
tion is further evident in syntheses of the completion proce-
dure and Gröbner basis generation [9], as in, for example,
[24].
An interesting feature of the complete set of reductions
produced by completion and the Gröbner bases produced by
Buchberger’s algorithm is that they are unique, regardless of
nondeterministic choices made along the way [15, 28]. In
other words, “best presentations” are unique for a given an
ordering of proofs.
Starting from a simple, abstract and universal setting, we
define a number of abstract properties of presentations, that
is, of arbitrary sets of formulæ. Fixing inference and the
ordering, we characterize the unique canonical presentation
in several ways, which are boxed like this in the following
sections:
1. Lemmata that can appear as assumptions in minimal
proofs (Definition 9)
2. Smallest saturated set (Theorem 3)
3. Simplest presentation (Theorem 4)
4. Non-redundant formulæ (Corollary 1)
5. Conclusions of trivial proofs (Corollary 2)
6. Limit of a fair completion process (Theorem 9)
Abstract formal definitions of redundancy, saturation,
canonicity, completeness, simplicity, triviality, and fairness
will be provided.
One of the main goals in our work is to demonstrate that
an abstract framework can be designed, with non-trivial re-
sults, without assuming anything about the context other
than the existence of a well-founded ordering of entities
called proofs. We believe we have attained a high level
of abstraction together with meaningful results because of
a fruitful definition of “good proofs”. Somewhat similarly
motivated research, includes [1, 35]; an attempt to get an
abstraction of critical pairs in category theory was proposed
in [31].
2. Proof Systems
We begin with the following structure, which we will call
an ordered proof system:
  Proofs  ;
  Formulæ  ;
  Assumptions  	
 ;
  Conclusion    ;
  Proof ordering  	 .
The important point is the proof ordering, which may be
partial. As usual, we use  for  . For conciseness
later, we will presume that proofs of different theorems are
incomparable:  implies    .
We will use the term presentation to mean a set of for-
mulæ, and justification to mean a set of proofs. We reserve
the term theory for deductively closed presentations.
For example, consider a propositional (ordered) resolu-
tion calculus: Formulæ are finite sets of literals; proofs are
finite ordered unary-binary trees, with formulæ for leaves
and literals labelling internal nodes. Propositional constants
are linearly ordered and proofs are compared using the cor-
responding recursive path ordering [12], but with all unary
nodes cheaper than all binary nodes. On the concrete level,
a binary node  corresponds to an inference
! #"! %$
 &! $
and a unary node  corresponds to '(*) ' , where  is a literal," is its negation, and  ,+- .$ are sets of literals. There are also





Let 1 32   "  +    + "  " + 54 ; the smallest proof of  (elabo-
rated with formulæ at internal nodes), assuming precedence
76 86  , is 9 );:<= )><:<= ) 9 

Extend  and  to sets (of proofs) in the standard
fashion: @?BADCFEGIH J ; ?KAL2   0MN? 4 . Trivially:
@O  O and O  O . It follows immediately from the defi-
nitions that  and  are monotonic: For all justifications ?
and P , ?RQP3STL?RQ@P and ?UQVPWSXY?RQVP .
Definition 1 (Proofs) The set of all proofs using some of
the assumptions:
  A 2 M   J!Q  4
For a specific conclusion  M , we sometimes write:
  :  A 2 !M       4
It follows from these definitions that for all presentations + 1 :
   Q  (1) Q1 S   Q   1 (2)
and for all justifications ? :
? Q   @? (3)
Note. Presentations and justifications are related by the
Galois connection formed by
 
and  with respect to Q .
From the previous definitions, it is easy to see that proofs
need only what they use, that is,
        .
The pre-image  of  are those proofs with exactly
as assumptions: 	  32 !IJ   4 .
Definition 2 (Theories)




  A Y  
2. A presentation

is a basis for a theory  if

   
3. A presentation

is deductively closed if

   
4. Presentations

and 1 are equivalent if they allow ex-
actly the same theorems:
 1 A 
   
 1
Most of our results depend on the following three stan-
dard properties of Tarskian consequence relations:
Monotonicity:
 Q1 S 








  Q 
 
We will assume that these postulates hold for all proof
systems considered in this paper.
Note. The Monotonicity Postulate requires inference sys-
tems to include structural weakening rules like
== .
We begin with some basic properties of proof systems
satisfying these postulates. First, transitivity of conse-
quences follows from Monotonicity and Closure: For all
presentations

, 1 and  , 
  1 
 1  US 
 
 . For all presentations  , by reflexivity,  Q 
  , and by
monotonicity,

  Q 

  . Finally, Closure allows one to




support exactly the same theorems:

   




         
Lemma 1   Q   1   Q1
3. Reduced Systems
Proof orderings allow for the following notion, central to
the development of the theory of canonical inference:
Definition 3 (Minimal Proofs)
 ? A 2 !M ?  @M? 6  4
Recall that  6  would only hold for proofs  +  with the
same conclusion.
Well-foundedness of the proof ordering means that min-
imal proofs suffice:         .
Proof orderings can be lifted to sets of proofs (using a
Smyth [33] powerdomain construction), as follows:
Definition 4 (Better Proofs) Justification P is better than
justification ? if:
?  P A ! !M ?  &M!P-!V
It is much better if:
? " P A ! !M ?  &M!P-!V
Better is clearly a quasi-order. Also, it is clear from the
definitions that ?#" P$&% S ?$"&% and ?' P'"
% ST? "(% .
On account of well-foundedness, minimal proofs always
exist. Hence the following statements hold:
Proposition 1 For all justifications ? +-P :
1. ?   ?
2. ?UQVPWS	? 0P
3. ? 0PWSXY?RQP
4. ? 0P   ?   P
5. ? "0P   ? "  P
and for all presentations
 + 1 :
1.
     1US 
  Q 
 1
2.
 Q1US      1
3. 1 Q        1US  1
As a consequence:  is a partial ordering on minimal
proofs.
Definition 5 (Flattening) Those assumptions employed in
minimal proofs are denoted
  A    
A presentation

is reduced (or flat) if
   
It is always the case that
  Q  : By definition,    Q 
. By monotonicity of  and the fact that    Q 
(Eq. 1), we get
       Q    Q  (4)
Lemma 2 Minimal proofs use the assumptions of minimal
proofs:
       
Proof: Suppose M    :  for some  . Then JVQ  
and  M   :   . Were there a 3M   :   Q   such
that  6  ,  would not be minimal in   . For the other
direction, suppose !M    :   Q   , but  is not minimal
in
 
. In other words, there is some DM   :  such that
N . There must be some  M    :  Q     such that
@ . This contradicts the minimality of  in    . 
Consequently, what is reduced cannot be further re-
duced, that is,
     . Applying the previous state-
ments allows us to derive

              
         
  . In other words, a reduced system
can prove as much as the initial one:
   
(5)
4. Saturated Systems
Now that we know how to define good proofs, we can
understand how much we can restrict a presentation and still
be able to prove everything.
Definition 6 (Normal Form Proof) A proof is in normal
form if it belongs to the set of minimal proofs that allow
the use of all theorems as lemmata. Normal form proofs are
denoted as follows:
  A    
 
We will also have occasion to use the notation
 :  A    : 
 
for normal-form proofs of formula  .
Considering only normal-form proofs does not restrict the
theory, as we have

      (6)
There are two manners in which a presentation can suf-
fice for normal form proofs:
Definition 7 (Completeness and Saturation) A presenta-
tion

is complete — denoted Compl

— if every theorem
has a normal form proof:
Compl
 A 
        
	
and is saturated — denoted Satur

— if it supports all pos-
sible normal form proofs:
Satur
 A      
A presentation is complete if it is saturated, but to prove
the converse, we will need (for Proposition 2 below) an ad-
ditional hypothesis:
Definition 8 Minimal proofs are unique if for all
 Q
and  M! it is the case that
    :  
5. Canonical Systems
Our main definition (of the sharpening operation) is:
Definition 9 (Canonical Presentation) The canonical pre-
sentation contains those formulæ that appear as assump-
tions of minimal proofs:
   A  
  
It follows from this definition that
       .
Theorem 1 The function
 
is canonical with respect to the
equivalence of presentations. That is:
1.
    
2.
 1      1  
3.
       
The canonical presentation cannot be further reduced as
we can show simply that     	
     . Furthermore, we get
the usual intuition about saturated sets:
Theorem 2 A presentation

is saturated iff it contains its
own canonical presentation:
Satur
      
Proof: As
   Q 1    Q   1 , and by the definition
of saturated, we need to show
         Q  
By Reflexivity and monotonicity of
 
:
  Q   
  . So,
for any minimal proof M    :  Q   : 
  there must
be a M    : 
    :  Q   :  such that    . By
minimality,    M   . In other words,    Q   . So
if       , then,   (   Q   .
Suppose now that
  Q   . In general, we have
            (7)
Since    Q   , we need only show that      Q   . Suppose  M      . Then there is a  M   Q   Q   
  (by Reflexivity) such that   .
But then 	M    
     . By (7)
  Q                     Q   





When we enforce equality instead of inclusion, that is,
when we consider presentations that are their own canonical






As a consequence, a presentation is canonical iff it is satu-
rated and reduced.
We can now state the second characterization of canoni-
cal presentations, namely as the smallest saturated set:
Theorem 3
 1 S  Satur 1  1     
Thus, the canonical presentation is minimal in the sense that





is saturated, then every equivalent superset
also is:
Satur
   1   Q1 S Satur 1 (8)
Consider again the resolution calculus: The canonical
presentation for
  2   "  +    + "  " 4 includes, in addition,2   " +    + "   " 4 . The canonical basis of 1   C 2 54 is
just 2  +  + " 4 . The canonical basis of 1 C 2  4 is the empty
clause.
Proposition 2 A presentation is complete if it is saturated.
If minimal proofs are unique, then a presentation is satu-
rated iff it is complete.
Proof: If  M 
  , then (by 6) there is a proof  M   of
 . If Satur

, then (by Theorem 2)
L QV       Q 
and  M      
	 , as required for completeness.
For the other direction, by completeness and (7), for all
 M 
  ,    :    :   O . By uniqueness of mini-
mal proofs,     :   +  :     . Hence, Satur  , with   :    :  for all  . 
6. Redundancy
Formulæ that when removed from a presentation do not
hurt proof quality will be called redundant. The notion of
redundancy lies at the heart of efficient theorem proving:
one seeks to perform inferences on non-redundant formulæ
so as to avoid redundancy propagation, whose cost could be
prohibitive.
Definition 10 (Simpler Presentation) Presentation 1 is
said to be simpler than presentation

when 1 provides
better proofs than does

:
 1 A  1       1





is a quasi-ordering. Denoting by  the associ-
ated equivalence, we get easily that
  1        1 .
The following sequence of facts of increasing interest




 Q1  1 S  1
2. 1 Q        1 S  N1





    
Proof: We show only
  

. By (5), the two theories
are equal. Thus, by (4) and the first fact,
  
. Applying
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, we get that
 
:





Theorem 4 A canonical presentation is the simplest:
 1US	1 
 
Definition 11 (Redundancy) A set % of formulæ is redun-
dant with respect to a presentation

when:
 C %    %
The set of all redundant formulæ of a given presentation

is denoted   :
  A 2 @M     	 2  4I4
The next result seems remarkable in its reliance on the
power of proof orderings: The set of all individually redun-
dant formulæ is globally redundant.
Lemma 3 The set of redundant formulæ is redundant:
     
Proof: Let
 $      . We show that      $
and conclude using Proposition 3.1. Consider some proof
  M
  :     $ . Since there is a redundant &M     

,
there must be a proof  M   :    2  4 	 Q   such that
    . But JV J  , so     . If M
  $ ,
then there would also be a M   , such that   3 .
Since the proof ordering is well-founded, this cannot go on
forever, so there is, in fact, a proof  M   :  $ such that
   . 
Theorem 5 Redundant formulæ are not needed:
      
Proof: If  M        , then       2 54 .
Thus,
 (  2 54 and  M   .
On the other hand, let  M   Q  , that is,  M J
for some  M    . Suppose  M   , in other words,  $    2 54 . So, there must be a proof    such
that LQ  $ . Since, then,   , we have  6  . Hence,
	M    , a contradiction. Thus,  M   . 
Corollary 1
     O
Lemma 3 is another corollary.
7. Subproofs
In the operational quest for the best proofs, a fundamen-
tal step is to perform localized searches for bad subproofs,
which could stand improvement. To that end, we now im-
pose additional structure on proofs: a well-founded sub-
proof (partial) order  . We extend this notation to sets:
?	 P A ! @MP  M? 

and use  for its reflexive closure.
A proof is deemed trivial when its conclusion depends
only on itself, that is, if J  2  4 , and it is its own only
subproof. Every formula admits a trivial proof, by Reflex-
ivity. We denote by   such a trivial proof of  M and by
 , the set of trivial proofs of each  M  .
We will hereinafter assume three things about subproofs:
Trivia. Assumptions are subproofs:
?  L?
Subproof. Subproofs use a subset of the assumptions:
? P S @?  @P
Replacement. Most significantly, decreasing a subproof,
decreases the whole proof:

 @ $ S   $ M  - $  $
As a consequence of Replacement:
Lemma 4 Once redundant, always redundant:
 $ S  $    Q   $
Theorem 6
         	
Proof: Suppose  M   . Then there is some proof
 M     such that     . Were   not minimal, then
by the Replacement Postulate, neither would  be mini-
mal. So,
  Q    . Clearly   Q  . Hence,   

  Q     
	 . For the other direction, suppose
 M       	 . Then  M      
	 Q0     
. 
Substituting the definition of
  
:
Corollary 2 The canonical presentation is the set of con-
clusions of all trivial normal-form proofs:




There are two basic applications for saturation-based in-
ference: constructing a finite canonical presentation when
such exists, and searching for proofs by forward reasoning
from axioms, avoiding inferences that do not help saturate.
Inference steps are defined by deduction mechanisms:
A deduction mechanism  is a function from presenta-
tions to presentations and we call the relation
  1 a
deduction step. (We consider only functional mechanisms
in this paper.)





' ) '  and '(*) ' , plus weakening.
Definition 12 (Soundness and Adequacy) A deduction
mechanism  is sound and adequate if:
   $ S  $
We only consider sound, adequate mechanisms:
Definition 13 (Derivation) A derivation is a chain of





(We consider only  -chains in this paper.)
Formulæ that appear at some stage of a derivation and
persist are deemed “persistent”:
Definition 14 (Persistent Formulæ) The limit

of a
derivation 2  
 4 
 is its persistent formulæ:
 
   
   
"!   

We are interested in the ability to derive minimal proofs:
Definition 15 (Saturating and Completing Derivations)
A derivation 2  
 4 
 is sound and adequate if     .
A sound and adequate derivation 2 
 4 
 is saturating if
Satur
 
. It is completing if Compl
 
.
Completing means that, at the limit, there is at least one
minimal proof per theorem; saturating means that all mini-
mal proofs are supported at the limit.
Definition 16 (Simplifying) A deduction mechanism  is
simplifying if proofs only get better: Q 
That is,
     $ whenever    $ .
Since the proof ordering is well-founded:
Lemma 5 If a deduction mechanism is simplifying then
  




for all # in a derivation 2  
 4 
 .
Proof: Let  
 M    :  
 . Since the derivation is sim-
plifying, there are proofs 

M   : 

, $R%# , such that
 
 W 
&   	 . By well-foundedness, from some point
on these are all the same proof  . Thus, LVQ  and
@M   . 
Note. For non-simplifying derivations this is not the case.
To wit, let




and consider      .
Lemma 6 A sufficient condition for a simplifying deriva-
tion 2  
 4 
 to be completing is that each non-normal-form
proof eventually becomes much better: 
   
   ) "  
  

Proof: By Lemma 5, if  
 M    :  
 then YM   :  ,
for some  . If M    then  M0        	 and
we are done. Otherwise, the sufficient condition implies
that for some * , there is a proof ,+M   + of  such that
 
 V@V	+ . Completeness follows by induction on proofs.

Though weaker conditions may suffice, we assume that
ordered proof systems have finitely-based proofs, in the
sense that they use only a finite number of assumptions:
! !M    J  6.-
Lemma 7 Any simplifying derivation 2  
 4 









. Suppose  M    . Consider  M0  . By the
properties of subproofs,   must be in normal form. Since
the derivation is simplifying,  persists from the moment
it appears in an


. We are assuming that there are only
finitely many such  . So from some * on, M   + . But + (
 . 
Note. This does not necessarily hold for infinitary sys-
tems. Let all proofs be incomparable, including:  
 (for
all # ),   == (for all # + $ ),   =   =	


: , and : . The derivation2    $  # 4 
 is simplifying, but only its limit includes the
infinitary proof.
A derivation is completing if every theorem of

even-
tually admits a persistent normal-form proof:

 ) Q        )	 (9)
Definition 17 (Canonical Derivations) A derivation2 
 4 
 is reducing if its persistent equations are all reduced:
   O
It is canonical if it is both saturating and reducing.
In other words, the limit of a reducing derivation is flat:    .
Lemma 8 A sufficient condition for a simplifying deriva-
tion 2  
 4 
 to be reducing is that no formula remain persis-
tently redundant:
  
    O
Proof: A formula  is redundant at the limit only if it has a
better proof than the trivial one. That (finitely-based) proof
must have come into existence at some stage * , at which
point  would have already become redundant. This condi-
tion then precludes the persistence of  . 
Lemma 9 A simplifying derivation 2 
 4 
 is canonical iff
    
Proof: We already know (Lemma 7) that
   
and,
therefore (Theorem 1.2), that
       .
So, if
     , then the result of the derivation is satu-
rated and reduced. On the other hands, if
      , then      . 
Now, we need to ensure that a deduction mechanism
makes continual progress with respect to proof quality and
that no useful inferences are forever ignored:
Definition 18 (Fairness) A sound and adequate functional
deduction mechanism

is progressive if it makes every non-
normal-form proof better:
  	   "     C  
	
A derivation 2 
 4 
 is fair for a progressive mechanism  if
all persistently progressive formulæ are derived:  Q  
  

Theorem 7 Fair simplifying derivations are complete.
Proof: Suppose  M 
  . By Lemma 7, it has a proof
3M    . If 3M    , we are done. So assume WM    
. The progressive mechanism

guarantees
the existence of a smaller proof @M     C   	 . Since
proofs are finite, each formula in L appears in  
   

for some  . Since the derivation is simplifying, if  M  
 ,
then for all $  # ,     for some proof   M    . By
Replacement, there is a proof  M    such that  0 
 . By induction, we eventually get a minimal proof of  . 
9. Completion
The central concept underlying completion [26] is the
existence of critical proofs. Completion alternates “expan-
sions” that infer the conclusions of critical proofs with “con-
tractions” that remove redundancies.
Definition 19 (Expansion and Contraction) A deduction
step




 C 1   is a contraction provided
 C 1 (
With the proof ordering we gave for the resolution calcu-
lus example, subsumption elimination and tautology elimi-
nation serve as contractions.
Proposition 4 Expansions and contractions are sound and
adequate.
Definition 20 (Critical Proof) A minimal proof M   
is critical if it is not in normal form, but all its subproofs
are:
 M      
  S @M  
Let  A    $   is critical for  and,$ is any proof such that
,$ 6  
Lemma 10 If
  Q   Q 
  , then  is progressive.
Proof: Every !M       is either bettered by the ad-
dition of
 
or, by induction on the subproof relation, has a
subproof that is bettered. In the latter case, by Replacement,




We are now able to describe an inference system, tra-
ditionally called “completion”, wherein each step
   $
is the composition of an expansion,
   C    1
followed by a contraction, 1  1    $ .
Bulk completion (cf. [3, 28–29]) is a sequence of steps:
    C   
Lemma 11 Bulk completion is simplifying.
Proof:
   $,S  C      C      $ . 
Lemma 12 The canonical presentation has no critical for-
mulæ:
     	  O .
Proof:            O . 
Corollary 3 The canonical presentation is stable under
bulk completion:
     $ S  $    
Theorem 8 Bulk completion is canonical, if minimal
proofs are unique:
     bulk
Proof: Bulk completion derives all progressive formulæ
immediately, so is fair. Completeness follows from Theo-
rem 7. By Proposition 2, the limit is also saturated. Bulk
completion also removes redundancies immediately, so is
reducing by Lemma 8. 
Fair completion is a derivation that is fair for

, and
which eventually deletes every redundancy.
Theorem 9 Fair completion is canonical, if minimal proofs
are unique:
     fair
10. Conclusion
The focus of this paper was our definition of the canon-
ical presentation for any deductive theory supplied with a
proof ordering. It is exactly what is needed for all theorems
to enjoy normal-form proofs. The structure of normal-form
(or “direct”) proofs is fixed by the ordering under which
they are minimal. We have given alternate characterizations
of the canonical presentation, derived many of its proper-
ties, and shown how it can be generated.
The notion of “saturation” in theorem proving, in which
redundant deductions are not necessary for completeness,
was suggested by Rusinowitch [32], and pursued most re-
cently in [8, 29]. Our definitions generalize the redundancy-
based notion of saturation to arbitrary proof orderings. See
[14].
Completion processes have been studied intensively
since their independent discovery and application to auto-
mated theorem proving by Knuth [26] and Buchberger [9].
The fundamental role of proof orderings in automated de-
duction was conceived in [6]. The completion principle can
be applied to numerous situations [13], including equational
rewriting [4, 22, 30], induction [25], and unification [18].
Our abstract framework can be applied to re-understand
completion mechanisms in a fully uniform setting. Be-
cause we have been generic in approach, the results here
apply in any completion-based framework, including stan-
dard completion mechanisms like ground completion [34]
(see [14]), equational completion, or completion for unifica-
tion, and also to derive new completion algorithms, such as
for constraint solving. (For constraint solving, one may—
contrariwise—seek out the “interesting” redundant formulæ
in order to favor local checks.)
Finally, it bears mentioning that, thanks to the Curry-
deBruijn-Howard morphism, one can consider a proof  as
a term whose type is precisely its conclusion  . Consid-
ering proof orderings would then be related to the definition
of an ordering on higher-order terms, as studied, for exam-
ple, in [23], or, for dependently typed terms, in [10, 37].
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